Why Isnt Consciousness Empirically Observable? Emotional Purposes As Basis For Self-Organization :: Logic Philosophy

Why Isn't Consciousness Empirically Observable? Emotional Purposes As Basis For Self-Organization ABSTRACT: Most versions of the knowledge argument say that if a scientist observing my brain does not know what my consciousness 'is like,' then consciousness is not identical with physical brain processes. This unwarrantedly equates 'physical' with 'empirically observable.' However, we can conclude only that consciousness is not identical with anything empirically observable. Still, given the intimate connection between each conscious event (C) and a corresponding empirically observable physiological event (P), what P-C relation could render C empirically unobservable? Some suggest that C is a relation among Ps which is distinguishable because it is multi-realizable; that is, C could have been realized by P2 rather than P1 and still have been the same relation. C might even be a 'self-organizing' process, appropriating and replacing its own material substrata. How can this account explain the empirical unobservability of consciousness? Because the emotions motivating attention direc tion, partly constitutive of phenomenal states, are executed, not undergone, by organisms. Organisms-self-organizing processes actively appropriating their needed physical substrata-feel motivations by generating them. Thus, experiencing someone's consciousness entails executing his or her motivations. That there is something empirically unobservable about phenomenal consciousness follows from a modified knowledge argument. Traditional versions (Jackson 1986; Robinson 1982; Noren 1979) hold that if experiencing were equivalent with physical brain states, then complete empirical knowledge of brain states should constitute knowledge of everything about my experiencing; but complete empirical knowledge of brain states would not constitute knowledge of everything about experiencing (those alone wouldn't reveal 'what it's like' to have that experience); therefore, experiencing is not equivalent with physical brain states. This argument can be criticized for unwarrantedly assuming that everything 'physical' is empirically observable (from an experimenter's standpoint). E.g., Jackson assumes that the 'what it's like' aspect isn't "expressible in physical language" (291), but the reason for granting this assumption is that 'what it's like' is inexpressible in terms of possible empirical ob servations. Without the assumption that everything 'physical' is empirically observable, we can conclude, not that consciousness is non-physical (since there might be 'physical' processes that are observationally inaccessible), but simply that consciousness isn't identical with anything empirically observable. Still, given the intimate connection between each conscious event (C) and a corresponding empirically observable physiological event (P), what P-C relationship could render C empirically unobservable? If identical, they should be equally observable. I.e., if P Â ® EO and C Â ® not-EO, then PÂ ¹C.